Posted On: October 29, 2008

Alford Plea v. Nolo Contendere Plea v. Guilty Plea

Is there a difference between an Alford Plea, a nolo contendere plea and a guilty plea. To begin, a plea of guilty is, in effect, "a conviction, the equivalent of a guilty verdict by a jury. In choosing to plead guilty, the defendant is waiving several constitutional rights, including his privilege against self- incrimination, his right to trial by jury, and his right to confront his accusers." State v. Andrews, 253 Conn. 497, 502-503 (2000).

Under North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25 (1970), a criminal defendant is not required to admit his guilt, but consents to being punished as if he were guilty to avoid the risk of proceeding to trial. . . . A guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is a judicial oxymoron in that the defendant does not admit guilt but acknowledges that the state's evidence against him is so strong that he is prepared to accept the entry of a guilty plea nevertheless." (Citation omitted; emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Daniels, 248 Conn. 64, 66-67 n.2 (1999). The entry of a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine carries the same consequences as a standard plea of guilty. By entering such a plea, a defendant may be able to avoid formally admitting guilt at the time of sentencing, but he nonetheless consents to being treated as if he were guilty with no assurances to the contrary. State v. Faraday, 268 Conn. 174, 204-205 (Conn. 2004).

Finally, a guilty plea under the Alford doctrine is . . . the functional equivalent [to an unconditional] plea of nolo contendere". State v. Palmer, 196 Conn. 157, 169 n.3 (1985); which itself "has the same legal effect as a plea of guilty on all further proceedings within the indictment. . . . The only practical difference is that the plea of nolo contendere may not be used against the defendant as an admission in a subsequent criminal or civil case." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Town of Groton v. USW, 254 Conn. 35, 49 (2000). It is clear, however, that a nolo contendere plea also constitutes a waiver of all nonjurisdictional defects in the same manner as a guilty plea. State v. Madera, 198 Conn. 92, 97 n.5 (1985); cf. Lott v. United States, 367 U.S. 421 (1961). See also Conn. Gen. Stat. ยง 54-94a.


Posted On: October 7, 2008

AR Proper for Multiple Crimes

Accelerated rehabilitation was properly granted to an individual accused of multiple crimes in connection with two seperate and unrelated incidents occurring approximatley one month apart. The state argued that the charges our of two unrelated incidents of shoplifting that occurred at two seperate retailers. The trial court granted the application.

Upon the successful completion of the program, the court dismissed the charges. The state appealed arguing that the court abused its discretion in granting accelerated rehabilitation because C.G.S. 54-56e could not properly be applied to the Defendant who allegedly committed the crimes during two seperate and unrelated incidents occurring approximately one month apart. The Appellate Court affirmed.

The language in the current version of C.G.S. 54-56e refers to "accellerate rehabilitation of persons accused of a crime or crimes..." The legislature's use of the singular "crime" and plural "crimes" unambigously reflects the legislature's intent that the statute may in the court's discretion be invoked with respect to a Defendant accused of either one or multiple crimes regardless of whether those crimes were temporally or otherwise related.

State v. Rios
Connecticut Appellate Court
Doc. No.: AC29109